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Abstract— The GPS is vulnerable to GPS spoofing attack 
(GSA), which leads to disorder in time and position results of the 
GPS receiver. In power grids, phasor measurement units (PMUs) 
use GPS to build time-tagged measurements, so they are 
susceptible to this attack. As a result of this attack, sampling time 
and phase angle of the PMU measurements change. In this paper, 
a neural network GPS spoofing detection (NNGSD) with 
employing PMU data from the dynamic power system is presented 
to detect GSAs. Numerical results in different conditions show the 
real-time performance of the proposed detection method 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since GPS systems use wireless communication, receivers 
are vulnerable to cyberattacks, including GPS spoofing attacks. 
The spoofer generates false GPS signals and broadcasts them 
[1]. The adjacent GPS receiver tracks transmitted fake signals, 
so false time tags are received [2].  
With the development of power grids into microgrids and 
their complexity, the use of PMUs as voltage and current phasor 
metering sensors is expanding [3]–[5]. The unique feature of 
them is network synchronization because they use accurate GPS 
time for sampling simultaneously [6]. 
Recent research in the field of detecting PMU attacks in 
power systems reveals two distinct approaches. These two 
categories can be divided into the following topics. 1-Model-
dependent approaches 2- Learning-based approaches.  
Given the importance of GPS spoofing attacks that lead to 
power system errors, it has always been a matter of significance 
to detect attacks as fast as possible which lead to a lot of 
research in this area. Among the model-dependent 
investigations, the following can be mentioned: In [7] an 
approach to investigate the vulnerability of PMUs in 
counterfeiting attacks and attack reconstruction is offered. In 
another study, two methods are presented to compare the 
information received from GPS receiver antennas with a 
specific pattern for attack detection [8]. In [9], a static model is 
developed to detect synchrophasor-based system states while a 
GSA is happened. In [10], an algorithm of integrating phasor 
measurement methods and state estimation methods to detect 
attacks is presented. Moreover, in [11], a correction system for 
states based on comparison with the measured states are 
presented for false data under attack.  
In model-based approaches, the main focus is on applying a 
system model to estimate the states or phase angles of the 
system, while in learning-based methods, data is of paramount 
importance [12]–[16]. In [17], using deep learning methods, 
FDI attacks are studied, and the behavioral characteristics of the 
power system against FDI attacks are extracted from past 
system data that utilize these features to detect attacks. [18] uses 
machine learning algorithms to classify secure and under FDI 
attacks measurements. In [19], a method is presented to detect 
anomalies based on FDI attacks using an observer consisting of 
two parts, Luenberger, and a neural network. 
In this paper, an artificial neural network(ANN)-based 
approach is proposed to detect GPS spoofing attacks using 
information measured by the PMU. Unlike methods that require 
updating their detectors, the proposed method can only perform 
one-time basic training of attack detection operations with less 
complexity and computation time. The performance of this 
method is such that it can be used even in various conditions 
such as network load changes and in the presence of noise. 
Moreover, the provided detector has the capability of detecting 
GPS spoofing attacks under different conditions and on several 
PMUs, despite the simplicity of the structure. The idea is based 
on training an ANN by a variety of attack models using 
different affected datasets of attacks. 
 The structure of this article is organized as follows. Section 
II introduces the basic concepts related to the structure of a 
power grid as well as basic information on ANNs. Section III 
discusses the approach used to detect GPS attacks. In Section 
IV, the simulation results of the proposed method for several 
attacks are discussed. Finally, the results and conclusions of this 
work are discussed in the final section. 
II.   PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
A. Power System Model 
A general linear dynamic model of a large scale power 
system is as follows [3], [4]: 
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where 𝑁𝑔 is the number of subsystems. 𝐴𝑖 and 𝐻𝑖𝑗  represent the 
transfer matrices of each subsystem individually and the 
relationship of each subsystem to the other subsystems, 
respectively. 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐿𝑖𝑗  are the matrices of the measurement of 
each subsystem and the relationship of each subsystem to other 
subsystems and 𝑤𝑖 and 𝜉𝑖 are the noise vectors. 
B. Neural Network Model 
ANNs are one of the areas of machine learning which have 
different types based on the architecture and the type of training 
algorithm. Feedforward backpropagation Neural Network 
(FNN) is a class of neural networks commonly used to model 
or classify and cluster training data. The knowledge extracted 
from the data by these neural networks will be used later for 
prediction purposes. 
The FNN is designed to find a hidden pattern or a nonlinear 
relationship between the input arguments and the output 
arguments (target) [20]. An ANN is made up of a large number 
of special interconnected processing elements called neurons; 
each captures the output of the previous layer and applies a 
specific weight and activation function, then transfers to the 
next layer [21] as follows: 
𝑌(𝑥) = 𝑓 (𝑏 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
 
(3) 
where 𝑌 is the neural network function with 𝑅𝑧 → 𝑅𝑙  mapping. 
𝑧 and 𝑙 are the number of input and output, respectively. 𝑥𝑖 is 
the 𝑖th row of neural network input, 𝑤𝑗  is the 𝑗th column of 
weight matrix, 𝑏 is the network bias vector and 𝑛 is the number 
of samples [22]. 
C. GPS Spoofing Attack Model in Power Grid 
The effect of GSA on the PMU measurements is a phase 
shift that is proportional to the amount of time manipulated by 
the spoofer.   This variation is same for all measurement signals 
at the time and it does not affect the absolute of the signals [2]. 
The relation between the spoofed measurement data and correct 
data is defined by (4) and (5): 
𝑥(𝑡) = |𝑥(𝑡)| 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜔𝑡 + 𝜃) (4) 
𝑥𝑠𝑝𝑓(𝑡) = |𝑥(𝑡)| 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝜔𝑡 + 𝜃 + 𝜃𝑠𝑝𝑓) (5) 
where 𝑥(𝑡) is a signal with phase angle 𝜃 without any attacks. 
𝑥𝑠𝑝𝑓(𝑡) is the spoofed 𝑥(𝑡) and 𝜃𝑠𝑝𝑓 is the change in the phase 
of the measured signal after GPS spoofing. 
III.    PROPOSED DETECTION ALGORITHM 
This section describes the method used to detect GSA. The 
process of NNGSD is illustrated in Fig. 1. It is based on a 
multilayer ANN trained in a specific process once and then, by 
receiving the real-time PMU measurements, NNGSD can 
detect the occurrence and location of GSAs. The structure of 
NNGSD consists of the following sections. 
 
Figure. 1.  Neural network GPS spoofing detector (NNGSD) structure   
A. Preprocessing Unit 
This unit handles the initial processing required to prepare 
the input data of the neural network. The input data of this block 
is considered PMU measurements which consist of rotor angles 
of generator buses in the power system. This block works in 
two stages. At first, it separates the time tags from the data 
measured by the PMUs and then, performs a preliminary 
analysis of the data obtained to detect and filter the clean data.  
B. Neural Network Unit 
The neural network used in the NNGSD structure is a 
multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network which can be 
created by expanding the standard form of neural network in 
(3). Considering 𝑁 as the hidden layers number plus input and 
output layers. Fig. 2 shows the structure of a multilayer network 
similar to the network used in this study. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Neural network  
 
The process of gathering data to train the neural network is 
as follows: Attacks are applied on the power grid with a specific 
framework and the data measured by the PMUs with sufficient 
information on how and where the attack occurs is formulated 
into the matrix 𝑀 in (6): 
𝑀 = [𝑥𝑖𝑗   𝑦𝑖𝑗]  (6) 
where 𝑛 is the number of samples. Each element of 𝑥𝑖𝑗  is the 
angle of 𝑗th rotor at 𝑖th sample. 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is a member of set {0,1} 
where 1 indicates the occurrence of the attack and 0 represents 
the non-occurrence of an attack. By determining the matrix 𝑀 
and the inputs and the outputs of the training data using (1) and 
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(2), the neural network is trained and the matrices 𝑊 and 𝑏 of 
each layer are calculated. 
C. Decision Unit 
This unit provides the last decision about the detection of 
GSA. The decision unit consists of the normalizer function and 
attack localization blocks. The objective of normalizer function 
block is to normalize the output of NN and to facilitate the 
attack locating process. The following equation is used to 
calculate the output vector of the normalizer block at the 𝑖th 
sample time  and 𝑗th output: 
 
𝑆(𝑦𝑖𝑗) = 𝑢(𝑦𝑖𝑗 − 𝛼) = {
1  𝑦𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝛼 
0  𝑦𝑖𝑗 < 𝛼
 (7) 
where 𝑢(. ) is a step function and 𝛼 is the normalization 
threshold coefficient which in addition to increasing the 
accuracy of the neural network output, improves the output of 
data analysis in subsequent blocks. The output of the normalizer 
unit 𝑆(𝑦𝑖) is given to the attack localization unit as an input 
vector. In this unit, if some elements of the input vector are one, 
the associated PMUs are reported as being attacked. The zero 
elements reveal the security of the related PMUs are. Fig. 3 
shows the normalizer function block. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   Normalizer function block 
 
 Finally, the Mux block tags the time data to the output data of 
attack location block. 
 
IV.    SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, the proposed method in section III is 
implemented and simulated in MATLAB software for the 
standard IEEE-14 bus power system with 5 generators. The 
simulation and verification process of the spoof detector is as 
follows. 
The neural network construction applied in the spoofing 
detector is defined based on the MLP neural network. The 
number of hidden layers is considered 3 and therefore, N=5. 
The set of  𝑆𝑞 = {𝑧, 20,50,20, 𝑙} shows the sequence of neurons 
number in each layer. In this set, 𝑧 = 5 and 𝑙 = 5. The 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 
𝑓3 and 𝑓4 are considered sigmoid functions with formula 𝑦 =
𝑒𝑥 (𝑒𝑥 + 1)⁄ . Fig. 4 shows the implemented neural network in 
MATLAB. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Neural network diagram 
 
For neural network training, in the normal condition of the 
power system, numerous spoofing attacks are applied to the 
system deliberately and by simulating (1) and (2), resulting in 
the input and output data for 𝑛 = 104 cases. Then, according to 
the data, matrix 𝑀 is constituted. The output of the neural 
network for each PMU under spoofing attack is 1 and 
otherwise, it is 0. In this paper, the number of PMUs is equal to 
the number of generators of power system (𝑁𝑔 = 5). The length 
of computation time window is 10 seconds. The parameters of 
the neural network are initially considered as standard and are 
calculated by trial and error parameters. By forming training 
matrices, neural network inputs and outputs are integrated into 
MATLAB training process.  
In the learning process of neural network using MATLAB 
software, the training data are automatically divided into three 
categories of training, testing and validation and the software 
presents a report on the accuracy of data training in these three 
sections. The overall accuracy of the proposed neural network 
at the training process is 98.4117%. 
To test the proposed neural network (NN) and NNGSD, 
new GSAs are considered as shown in Fig. 5 and they are tested 
in three conditions; normal operation, in the presence of noise 
and in load change condition. The outputs are calculated by 
applying the input data to the NNGSD. Then, the accuracy of 
the proposed detector is tested by comparing the output of the 
detector to the simulated output data. 
 
Fig. 5.  The angle of GSAs considered on PMUs 
A. GSA Detection in the Normal Operation of Power System 
In this case, the performance of the NNGSD under normal 
and standard condition of the power system considering some 
GSAs on different PMUs are investigated. The results of the 
NNGSD outputs are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6.  Detection of multi GSAs on the PMUs 
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 As shown in Fig. 6, the results of proposed method are with 
high precision. Table 2 shows the detection percentage of 
proposed NN and NNGSD. 
Table 2.  Percentage of attack detection on PMUs in normal operation 
 
Normal Measurement + GSA 
attack 
NN Output NNGSD 
PMU1 91.9691 95.7534 
PMU2 92.1414 97.3672 
PMU3 92.9975 98.8955 
PMU4 92.9990 98.9701 
PMU5 92.9973 98.0152 
Overall 92.6208 98.8002 
B. GSA Detection in the Presence of Noise 
 To test the robustness of the NNGSD and its performance 
in the presence of noise, some further analysis is done. In noisy 
condition, noise signals with normal distribution function and 
variance σ = 0.1 with SNR ≅ 20 db are added to the measured 
data in simulation. By applying the noisy data, which also 
includes the effects of the spoofing attack, the spoofing 
detection results of NN and NNGSD are shown in Fig. 7 and 8, 
respectively. The attack detection percentage of NN and 
NNGSD are given in Table 3. 
 
Fig. 7.  Detection of multi GSA on PMUs in the presence of noise using NN 
 
Fig. 8.  Detection of multi GSA on the PMUs in the presence of noise using 
NNGSD 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Percentage of attack detection on PMUs in presence of noise 
 Noisy Measurement + GSA attack 
NN Output NNGSD 
PMU1 89.0123 92.1088 
PMU2 91.5009 97.6895 
PMU3 91.9975 97.9234 
PMU4 91.9990 98.1308 
PMU5 91.9973 98.2525 
Overall 91.3014 96.8210 
C. GSA Detection in the Load Changing Condition 
In the following, the existence of controlled power load 
changes is considered. In this case, the load changes are applied 
to the measured data in the presence of the attack by changing 
the input of the control in (1). The outputs of NN and NNGSD 
are shown in Fig. 9 and 10, respectively. The GSA detection 
percentage of NN and NNGSD with measurements in the 
presence of noise and load changing are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  The output of NN with spoofed measurements in the presence of noise 
and load changing 
 
Fig. 10.  The output of NNGSD with spoofed measurements in the presence of 
noise and load changing 
Table 4.  Percentage of attack detection on PMUs 
 Measurements under 
load changing + GSA 
attack 
Measurements under 
noise and load changing 
+ GSA attack 
NN 
Output 
NNGSD 
NN 
Output 
NNGSD 
PMU1 77.5918 86.5067 77.5811 85.2569 
PMU2 90.2368 97.2514 87.7733 91.2509 
PMU3 90.9976 98.9725 91.9976 99. 8925 
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PMU4 90.9975 98.9881 91.9975 99.9912 
PMU5 90.9301 98.9976 91.9284 99.8714 
Overall 88.1507 96.1432 88.2555 94.0926 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a GPS spoofing detector based on a neural 
network is proposed. The structure of the NNGSD consists of 
two main parts; a trained neural network and a decision block 
component which announce the final diagnosis about the GPS 
spoofing attacks and the location of them. The proposed method 
is tested by noisy and in load changing conditions which 
haven’t been previously in the training process.  
Simulation results indicate the efficacy of the proposed 
method in real-time GSA detecting while the measurements are 
noisy or the system loads are changed suddenly.  
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